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Non-intervention is commonly understood as the norm in international society, 
but should military intervention be permissible when governments massively 
violate the human rights of their citizens, are unable to prevent such violations, 
or if states have collapsed into civil war and anarchy?  This is the guiding 
question addressed in this chapter.  International law forbids the use of force 
except for purposes of self-defence and collective enforcement action authorized 
by the UN Security Council (UNSC).  The challenge posed by humanitarian 
intervention is whether it also should be exempted from the general ban on the 
use of force.  This chapter examines arguments for and against forcible 
humanitarian intervention.  The theoretical analysis is explored in relation to 
humanitarian intervention during the 1990s and the war on terror.  The final 
section focuses on The Responsibility to Protect, an important attempt to address 




Humanitarian intervention poses a hard test for an international society built on 
principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, and the non-use of force.  
Immediately after the holocaust, the society of states established laws prohibiting 
genocide, forbidding the mistreatment of civilians, and recognising basic human 
rights.  These humanitarian principles often conflict with principles of sovereignty 
and non-intervention.  Sovereign states are expected to act as guardians of their 
citizens‟ security, but what happens if states behave as criminals towards their 
own people, treating sovereignty as a licence to kill?  Should tyrannical states1 
be recognized as legitimate members of international society and accorded the 
protection afforded by the non-intervention principle?  Or, should states forfeit 
their sovereign rights and be exposed to legitimate intervention if they actively 
abuse or fail to protect their citizens?  Related to this, what responsibilities do 
other states or institutions have to enforce human rights norms against 
governments that massively violate them?   
 
Armed humanitarian intervention was not a legitimate practice during the 
cold war because states placed more value on sovereignty and order than on the 
enforcement of human rights.  There was a significant shift of attitudes during 
the 1990s, especially among liberal democratic states, which led the way in 
pressing new humanitarian claims within international society.  The UN 
Secretary-General noted the extent of this change in a speech to the General 
Assembly in September 1999.  Kofi Annan declared that there was a „developing 
international norm‟ to forcibly protect civilians who were at risk from genocide 
and mass killing.  The new norm was a weak one, however.  At no time did the 
UNSC authorise forcible intervention against a fully-functioning sovereign state 
and intervention without UNSC authority remained controversial.  States in the 
global south especially continued to worry that humanitarian intervention was a 
„Trojan horse‟: rhetoric designed to legitimate the interference of the strong in the 
affairs of the weak.  At the same time, however, a group of liberal democratic 
states and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) attempted to build a 
consensus around the principle of the responsibility to protect.  The 
responsibility to protect insists that states have primary responsibility for 
protecting their own citizens.  However, if they are unwilling or unable to do so, 
the responsibility to end atrocities and mass killing is transferred to the wider 
„international community‟.  The responsibility to protect was adopted by the UN 
General Assembly in a formal declaration at the 2005 UN World Summit.  Its 
advocates argue that it will play an important role in building consensus about 
humanitarian action whilst making it harder for states to abuse humanitarian 
justifications.   
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This chapter is divided into five sections.  The first sets out the arguments 
for both a legal right and a moral duty of humanitarian intervention.  The second 
section outlines objections to humanitarian intervention, including realist, legal 
and moral objections.  Next we consider the evolution of state practice during the 
1990s, and in the post-9/11 era.  The final section focuses on the responsibility 
to protect.      
       
The Case for Humanitarian Intervention 
 
In the first part, we explore the legal case for a right of humanitarian 
intervention, commonly labelled counter-restrictionist, and in the second part 
we discuss the moral justification for it. 
 
The legal argument 
 
The „counter-restrictionist‟ case for a legal right of individual and collective 
humanitarian intervention rests on two claims: first, the UN Charter commits 
states to protecting fundamental human rights, and second, there is a right of 
humanitarian intervention in customary international law. 
  
 Counter-restrictionists argue that human rights are just as important as 
peace and security in the UN Charter.  The Charter‟s preamble and Articles 1(3), 
55 and 56 all highlight the importance of human rights.  Indeed, Article 1(3) 
identifies the protection of human rights as one of the principle purposes of the 
UN system.  This has led counter-restrictionists to read a humanitarian exception 
to the ban on the use of force in the UN Charter.  Michael Reisman (1985: 279-
80) argued that given the human rights principles in the Charter, the UNSC 
should have taken armed action during the cold war against states that 
committed genocide and mass murder.  The on-going failure of the UNSC to fulfil 
this legal responsibility led him to assert that a legal exception to the ban on the 
use of force in Article 2(4) of the Charter, should be created that would permit 
individual states to use force on humanitarian grounds.  Likewise, some 
international lawyers (e.g. Damrosch 1991: 219) argued that humanitarian 
intervention did not breach Article 2(4) because the article only prohibits the use 
of force against the „political independence‟ and „territorial integrity‟ of states and 
humanitarian intervention does neither of these things. 
 
 Other counter-restrictionists admitted that there is no legal basis for 
unilateral humanitarian intervention in the UN Charter, but argued that 
humanitarian intervention is permitted by customary international law.  For a 
rule to count as customary international law, states must actually engage in the 
practice that is claimed to have the status of law, and they must do so because 
they believe that the law permits this.  International lawyers describe this as 
opinio juris.  Counter-restrictionists contend that the customary right to 
humanitarian intervention preceded the UN Charter, evidenced by the legal 
arguments offered to justify the British, French and Russian intervention in 
Greece (1827) and American intervention in Cuba (1898).  They also point to 
British and French references to customary international law to justify the 
creation of safe havens in Iraq (1991) and Kofi Annan‟s insistence that even 
unilateral intervention to halt the 1994 genocide in Rwanda would have been 
legitimate. 
 
 There are, however, a number of problems with both elements of the 
counter-restrictionist case.  They exaggerate the extent of consensus about the 
rules governing the use of force and their reading of the textual provisions of the 
UN Charter runs contrary to both majority international legal opinion (e.g. 
Brownlie 1974, Chesterman 2001) and the opinions expressed by its architects at 
the end of the Second World War.   
 
The moral case 
 
Many writers argue that irrespective of what the law says, there is a moral duty to 
intervene to protect civilians from genocide and mass killing.  They argue that 
sovereignty derives from a state‟s responsibility to protect its citizens and when 
a state fails in its duty, it loses its sovereign rights (Tesón 2003: 93).  There are a 
number of different ways of arriving at this argument.  Some point to the idea of 
common humanity to argue that all individuals have basic human rights and 
duties to uphold the rights of others (Caney 1997: 34).  Others argue that today‟s 
globalized world is so integrated that massive human rights violations in one part 
of the world have an effect on every other part, creating moral obligations (Blair 
1999).  Some advocates of Just War theory argue that the duty to offer charity to 
those in need is universal (Ramsey 2002: 35-6).  A further variety of this 
argument insists that there is moral agreement between the world‟s major 
religions and ethical systems that genocide and mass killing are grave wrongs 
and that others have a duty to prevent them and punish the perpetrators (Lepard 
2002). 
 
 There are problems with this perspective too.  Granting states a moral 
permit to intervene opens the door to potential abuse: the use of humanitarian 
arguments to justify wars that are anything but.  Furthermore, those who 
advance moral justifications for intervention run up against the problem of how 
bad a humanitarian crisis has to have become before force can be used, and 
there is also the thorny issue of whether force should be used to prevent a 
humanitarian emergency from developing in the first place. 
 
Key points 
 Counter-restrictionists argue in favour of a legal right of humanitarian 
intervention based on interpretations of the UN Charter and customary 
international law. 
 The claims for a moral duty of humanitarian intervention stem from the 
basic proposition that all individuals are entitled to a minimum level of 
protection from harm by virtue of their common humanity. 
 








The Case Against Humanitarian Intervention 
 
Seven key objections to humanitarian intervention have been advanced, at 
various times, by scholars, international lawyers and policymakers.  These 
objections are not mutually exclusive and can be found in the writings of Realists, 
Liberals, Feminists, Postcolonial theorists and others, though these different 
theories afford different weight to each of the objections. 
 
No basis for humanitarian intervention in international law 
 
Restrictionist international lawyers insist that the common good is best 
preserved by maintaining a ban on any use of force not authorized by the UNSC. 
They argue that aside from the right of individual and collective self-defence 
enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter, there are no other exceptions to Article 
2(4).  They also point to the fact that during the cold war when states acting 
unilaterally could have plausibly invoked humanitarian claims (the key cases are 
India‟s intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, Vietnam‟s intervention in Cambodia 
in December 1978, and Tanzania‟s intervention in Uganda in January 1979), they 
had chosen not to do so.  Interveners have typically either claimed to be acting in 
self-defence (during the cold war especially), have pointed to the „implied 
authorization‟ of UNSC resolutions, or have refrained from making legal 
arguments at all.   
 
States do not intervene for primarily humanitarian reasons 
 
States almost always have mixed motives for intervening and are rarely prepared 
to sacrifice their own soldiers overseas unless they have self-interested reasons 
for doing so.  For Realists this means that genuine humanitarian intervention is 
imprudent because it does not serve the national interest.  For other critics, it 
points to the idea that the powerful only intervene when it suits them to do so 
and that strategies of intervention are more likely to be guided by calculations of 
national interest than by what is best for the victims in whose name the 




States are not allowed to risk the lives of their soldiers to save strangers 
 
Realists not only argue that states do not intervene for humanitarian purposes; 
their statist paradigm also asserts that states should not behave in this way.  
Political leaders do not have the moral right to shed the blood of their own 
citizens on behalf of suffering foreigners.  Bhikhu Parekh (1997: 56) encapsulates 
this position: „citizens are the exclusive responsibility of their state, and their 
state is entirely their own business‟.  Thus, if a civil authority has broken down or 
is behaving in an appalling way towards its citizens, this is the responsibility of 
that state‟s citizens, and crucially its political leaders. 
 
The problem of abuse   
 
In the absence of an impartial mechanism for deciding when humanitarian 
intervention is permissible, states might espouse humanitarian motives as a 
pretext to cover the pursuit of national self-interest (Franck and Rodley 1974).  
The classic case of abuse was Hitler‟s argument that it was necessary to invade 
Czechoslovakia to protect the „life and liberty‟ of that country‟s German 
population.  Creating a right of humanitarian intervention would only make it 
easier for the powerful to justify interfering in the affairs of the weak.  Critics 
argue that a right to intervention would not create more „genuine‟ humanitarian 
action because self-interest not sovereignty has traditionally been the main 
barrier to intervention.  However, it would make the world a more dangerous 
place by giving states more ways of justifying force (Chesterman 2001). 
 
Selectivity of response 
 
States always apply principles of humanitarian intervention selectively, resulting 
in an inconsistency in policy.  Because state behaviour is governed by what 
governments judge to be in their interest, they are selective about when choose to 
intervene.  The problem of selectivity arises when an agreed moral principle is at 
stake in more than one situation, but national interest dictates a divergence of 
responses.  A good example of the selectivity of response is the argument that 
NATO‟s intervention in Kosovo could not have been driven by humanitarian 
concerns because it has done nothing to address the very much larger 
humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur.  Selectivity of response is the problem of 
failing to treat like cases alike. 
 
Disagreement about moral principles 
 
Pluralist international society theory identifies an additional objection to 
humanitarian intervention, the problem of how to reach a consensus on what 
moral principles should underpin it.  Pluralism is sensitive to human rights 
concerns but argues that humanitarian intervention should not be permitted in 
the face of disagreement about what constitutes extreme human rights violations.  
The concern is that in the absence of consensus on what principles should 
govern a right of humanitarian intervention, the most powerful states would be 
free to impose their own culturally determined moral values on weaker members 
of international society.   
 
Intervention does not work 
 
A final set of criticisms suggests that humanitarian intervention should be 
avoided because it is impossible for outsiders to impose human rights.  Liberals 
argue that states are established by the informed consent of their citizens.  Thus, 
one of the foremost nineteenth century liberal thinkers, John Stuart Mill (1973: 
377-8), argued that democracy could only be established by a domestic struggle 
for liberty.  Human rights cannot take root if they are imposed or enforced by 
outsiders.  Interveners will therefore find either that they become embroiled in an 
unending commitment or that human rights abuses re-ignite after they depart.  




 States will not intervene for primarily humanitarian purposes. 
 States should not place their citizens in harm‟s way in order to protect 
foreigners. 
 A legal right of humanitarian intervention would be vulnerable to abuse as 
states employ humanitarian claims to cloak the pursuit of self-interest. 
 States will apply principles of humanitarian intervention selectively. 
 In the absence of consensus about what principles should guide 
humanitarian intervention, a right of humanitarian intervention would 
undermine international order. 
 Humanitarian intervention will always be based on the cultural preferences 
of the powerful 
 
The aim of the following two sections is to demonstrate how these different 
ideas and claims play out in world politics, and to chart how far there is an 
emerging norm of humanitarian intervention. 
 
The 1990s: A Golden Era of Humanitarian Activism? 
 
It has become common to describe the immediate post cold war period as 
something of a „golden era‟ for humanitarian activism.  Thomas Weiss (2004: 136) 
argues that „the notion that human beings matter more than sovereignty radiated 
brightly, albeit briefly, across the international political horizon of the 1990s‟.  
There is no doubt that during the 1990s, states began to contemplate 
intervention to protect imperilled strangers in distant lands.  This was symbolised 
for many by NATO‟s intervention to halt Serb atrocities in Kosovo in March 1999 
and the Australian led intervention to end mass killing in East Timor.  But the 
1990s also saw the world stand aside during the genocides in Rwanda and 
Srebrenica.  This section tries to make sense of these developments by focusing on 
international interventions in northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda and Kosovo. It is 
divided into three parts: the place of humanitarian impulses in decisions to 





The role of humanitarian sentiments in decisions to intervene 
 
In the case of northern Iraq in April 1991, but also Somalia in December 1992, 
domestic public opinion played an important role in pressurizing policymakers into 
using force for humanitarian purposes.  In the face of a massive refugee crisis 
caused by Saddam Hussein‟s oppression of the Kurds in the aftermath of the 1991 
Gulf War, US, British, French, and Dutch military forces intervened to create 
protected „safe havens‟ for the Kurdish people.  Similarly, the US military 
intervention in Somalia in December 1992 was a response to sentiments of 
compassion on the part of US citizens. However, this sense of solidarity 
disappeared once the United States began sustaining casualties. The fact that the 
White House pulled the plug on its Somali intervention after the loss of eighteen 
US Rangers in a fire-fight in October 1993 indicates how capricious public opinion 
is.  Television pictures of starving and dying Somalis had persuaded the outgoing 
Bush administration to launch a humanitarian rescue mission, but once the US 
public saw dead Americans dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, the Clinton 
administration announced a timetable for withdrawal. What this case 
demonstrates is that the „CNN effect‟ is a double-edged sword: it can pressurize 
governments into humanitarian intervention, yet with equal rapidity produce 
public disillusionment and calls for withdrawal.  However, these cases suggest that 
even if there are no vital national interests at stake, liberal states might launch 
humanitarian rescue missions if sufficient public pressure is mobilized. Certainly, 
there is no evidence in either of these cases to support the realist claim that states 
cloak power political motives behind the guise of humanitarianism.  
      
 By contrast, the French intervention in Rwanda in July 1994 seems to be an 
example of abuse. The French government emphasized the strictly humanitarian 
character of the operation, but this interpretation lacks credibility given the 
evidence that they were covertly pursuing national self-interest. France had 
propped up the one-party Hutu state for twenty years, even providing troops when 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), operating out of neighbouring Uganda, 
threatened to overrun the country in 1990 and 1993. The French President, 
François Mitterrand, was reportedly anxious to restore waning French influence in 
Africa, and was fearful that an RPF victory in French-speaking Rwanda would 
bring the country under the influence of Anglophones. France therefore did not 
intervene until the latter stages of the genocide, which was ended primarily by the 
RPF‟s military victory.  It seems, therefore, that French behaviour accords with the 
realist premise that states will only risk their soldiers in defence of the national 
interest. French leaders may have been partly motivated by humanitarian 
sentiments but this seems to be a case of a state abusing the concept of 
humanitarian intervention since the primary purpose of the intervention was to 
protect French national interests. 
 
 The moral question raised by French intervention is why international 
society failed to intervene when the genocide began in early April 1994. French 
intervention might have saved some lives but it came far too late to halt the 
genocide.  Some 800,000 people were killed in a mere hundred days.  The failure of 
international society to stop the genocide indicates that state leaders remain 
gripped by the mindset of statism.  There was no intervention for the simple 
reason that those with the military capability to stop the genocide were unwilling to 
sacrifice troops and treasure to protect Rwandans.  International solidarity in the 
face of genocide was limited to moral outrage and the provision of humanitarian 
aid. 
      
 If the French intervention in Rwanda can be criticized for being too little, too 
late, NATO‟s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was criticized for being too much, too 
soon.  At the beginning of the war, NATO said it was intervening to prevent a 
humanitarian catastrophe.  To do this, NATO aircraft were given two objectives, 
reduce Serbia‟s military capacity and coerce Milošević into accepting the 
Rambouillet settlement, with the emphasis initially placed on the former.  Three 
arguments were adduced to support NATO‟s claim that the resort to force was 
justifiable. First, it was argued that Serbian actions in Kosovo had created a 
humanitarian emergency and breached a whole range of international legal 
commitments.  Second, NATO governments argued that the Serbs were committing 
crimes against humanity, possibly including genocide.  Third, it was contended 
that the Milošević regime‟s use of force against the Kosovar Albanians challenged 
global norms of common humanity. 
      
 Closer analysis of the justifications articulated by Western leaders suggests 
that whilst humanitarianism may have provided the primary impulse for action, it 
was by no means the exclusive impulse, and the complexity of the motives of the 
interveners coloured the character of the intervention.  Indeed, NATO was 
propelled into action by a mixture of humanitarian concern and self-interest 
gathered around three sets of issues.  The first might be called the „Srebrenica 
syndrome‟ – a fear that left unchecked Milošević‟s henchmen would replicate the 
carnage of Bosnia in Kosovo.  The second is related directly to self-interest and was 
a concern that protracted conflict in the southern Balkans would create a massive 
refugee crisis in Europe.  Finally, NATO governments were worried that if they 
failed to contain the crisis, it would spread and engulf several neighbouring states 
especially Macedonia and Albania, Bulgaria (Bellamy 2002: 3).  This suggests that 
humanitarian intervention might be prompted by mixed motives.  This only 
becomes a problem if the non-humanitarian motives undermine the chances of 
achieving the humanitarian purposes. 
 
How legal and legitimate were the interventions? 
 
In contrast with state practice during the cold war, the interventions in northern 
Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda and Kosovo were all justified in humanitarian terms by the 
intervening states.   Justifying the use of force on humanitarian grounds remained 
hotly contested, with China, Russia and members of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) defending a traditional interpretation of state sovereignty.  However, this 
position became less tenable as the 1990s progressed, and by the end of the 
decade most states were prepared to accept that the UNSC was entitled to 
authorize armed humanitarian intervention.  Thus, almost every peacekeeping 
mandate passed by the UNSC since 2000 contains an instruction for international 
soldiers to protect endangered civilians, using force if necessary and prudent.  
Chapter VII of the Charter enables the UNSC to authorize military enforcement 
action only in cases where it finds a threat to „international peace and security‟.  
Since the early 1990s, the UNSC has expanded its list of what counts as a threat 
to the peace to include human suffering, the overthrow of democratic government, 
state failure, refugee movements, and ethnic cleansing.  This attempt to justify 
humanitarian intervention on the grounds that human suffering constitutes a 
threat to international security was first controversially employed in the cases of 
northern Iraq and Somalia (Wheeler 2000, 2004: 32-41). 
      
 NATO‟s intervention in Kosovo raised the fundamental question of how 
international society should treat intervention where a state, or in this case a 
group of states, decide to use force to alleviate human suffering without the explicit 
authorization of the Security Council.  Although the UN did not expressly sanction 
NATO‟s use of force, the UNSC also chose not to condemn it.  Russia tabled a draft 
UNSC resolution on 26 March 1999 condemning NATO‟s use of force and 
demanding an immediate halt to the bombing.  Surprisingly, only Russia, China, 
and Namibia voted in favour, leading to a resounding defeat of the resolution.  The 
UNSC‟s response to NATO‟s breach of the UN Charter‟s rules governing the use of 
force suggested that whilst it was not prepared to endorse unilateral humanitarian 
intervention, it was not necessarily going to condemn it either. 
 
 What emerges from post cold war state practice is that Western states took 
the lead in advancing a new norm of armed humanitarian intervention.  Although 
some states, notably Russia, China, India, and some members of the NAM 
remained very uneasy with this development, they had reluctantly come to accept 
by the end of the 1990s that military intervention authorized by the UNSC was 
justifiable in cases of genocide and mass killing.  The best illustration of this is the 
fact that no member of the UNSC tried to oppose intervention in Rwanda to end 
the genocide on the grounds that this violated its sovereignty.  Instead, the barrier 
to intervention was the lack of political will on the part of states to incur the costs 
and risks of armed intervention to save Rwandans.  There were also important 
limits to the emerging norm: intervention outside the UN remained very 
controversial; the UNSC refrained from authorizing intervention against fully 
functioning states; and although it is inconceivable that any state would have 
complained about intervention in Rwanda, this was a uniquely horrible case with a 
rate of killing higher than that of the holocaust. 
 
Were the interventions successful? 
 
Does the record of post-cold war interventions lend support to the proposition that 
the use of force can promote humanitarian values?  Humanitarian outcomes might 
usefully be divided into short and long-term ones.  The former would refer to the 
immediate alleviation of human suffering through the termination of genocide or 
mass murder and/or the delivery of humanitarian aid to civilians trapped in war 
zones.  Long-term humanitarian outcomes focus on how far intervention addresses 
the underlying causes of human suffering by facilitating conflict-resolution and the 
construction of viable polities.  
      
 „Operation Safe Haven‟ in Iraq enjoyed initial success in dealing with the 
refugee problem in northern Iraq and clearly saved lives. However, as the media 
spotlight began to shift elsewhere and public interest waned, so did the 
commitment of Western governments to protect the Kurds. Whilst Western air 
forces continued to police a „no-fly zone‟ over northern Iraq, the intervening states 
quickly handed over the running of the safe havens to what they knew was an 
ill-equipped and badly supported UN relief operation. This faced enormous 
problems owing to Iraqi hostility towards its Kurdish minority. Nevertheless, the 
Kurds were able to fashion a significant degree of autonomy in the 1990s, which 
has persisted since the 2003 US-led invasion. 
      
 Some commentators identify the initial US intervention in Somalia in the 
period between December 1992 and May 1993 as a successful humanitarian 
intervention. In terms of short-term success, the US claims that it saved 
thousands of Somalis from starvation, though this is disputed (Weiss 1999: 82-7).  
What is not disputed is that the mission ended in disaster.  This can be traced to 
the attempt by UNOSOM II (this UN force took over from the United States in May 
1993 but its military missions were principally controlled by US commanders) to go 
beyond the initial US mission of famine relief to the disarmament of the warring 
factions and the provision of law and order.  Suffering always has political causes, 
and the rationale behind the expanded mandate of UNOSOM II was to try and put 
in place a framework of political civility that would prevent a return to civil war and 
famine.  However, this attempt to convert a short-term humanitarian outcome 
(famine relief) into the longer-term one of conflict-resolution and reconstruction 
proved a failure.  Once the UNSC had sanctioned the arrest of General Aidid after 
his forces killed twenty three UN peace-keepers in June 1993, UNOSOM II acted 
like an imperial power, relying on high-tech American weaponry to police the 
streets of southern Mogadishu. 
  
 The jury remains out on whether the international community can succeed 
in building a new multiethnic state in Kosovo.  On the one hand, an improved 
security situation has enabled a marked decrease in the number of international 
soldiers and police deployed there and there have been a number of successful 
elections and transitions of power.  On the other hand, ethnic violence remains a 
feature of life in province, there is high unemployment, and Kosovo has become a 
haven for organized crime.  Looking back, the NATO-led force that entered Kosovo 
at the end of Operation Allied Force succeeded in returning Kosovar Albanian 
refugees to their homes but failed to protect the Serbian community from reprisal 
attacks. 
  
 The conclusion that emerges from this brief overview is that forcible 
intervention in humanitarian crises is most likely to be a short-term palliative that 
does little to address the underlying political causes of the violence and suffering.  
It is for this reason that the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) insisted that intervention was only one of three international 
responsibilities, the other two involving long-term commitments to building the 
political, social, economic, military and legal conditions necessary for the 
promotion and protection of human rights. 
 
Humanitarian Intervention and the War on Terror 
 
What effect did the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 have on 
humanitarian intervention?  Has the „war on terror‟ made it less likely that 
powerful states will use their militaries to save strangers?  Is there a danger that 
US administrations will return to their Cold War policy of prioritizing strategic 
advantage over human rights?  There are two prominent perspectives on these 
questions. 
 
 The first is a sceptical position.  It holds that since the „war on terror‟ 
began, the United States has placed its own strategic interests ahead of concern 
for human rights, both overseas and at home.  It has become more willing to align 
itself with repressive governments such as Tajikistan and Sudan that support its 
anti-terror strategy (Ignatieff 2002).  According to this view, where it might have 
been difficult to marshal Western commitment to humanitarian intervention in 
the 1990s, it has become virtually impossible after 9/11.  Since 2001, the 
Western contribution to peace operations has markedly declined.  Just as 
worrying for the skeptics is the fear that the US and its allies are actually 
undermining the consensus on humanitarian intervention by abusing 
humanitarian principles in justifying their use of force. 
 
 The second perspective is more optimistic.  It springs from the core premise 
that Western states will only militarily intervene in humanitarian emergencies if 
they believe that vital security interests are at stake.  For the optimists, 
Afghanistan seemed to show that there is often a critical linkage between failed 
states and terrorism.  Therefore, they predicted that the war on terror could 
provide the necessary strategic interests to motivate intervention that is 
defensible on grounds of both human rights and national security (Chesterman 
2004).  The Afghanistan experience might be seen as supporting the optimistic 
viewpoint, though important question marks can be raised over whether military 
means have been properly calibrated to humanitarian ends since the intervention 
in October 2001 (Wheeler and Morris 2006).  However, the more recent 
experiences in relation to Iraq and Darfur suggests not only that the war on terror 
has fractured the fragile consensus over humanitarian intervention, but also that 
the problem of political will continues to bedevil effective humanitarian 
intervention as it did over Rwanda.  Indeed, the Darfur case suggests that the 
commitment of to the war on terror is making it less likely that it will intervene to 




Although the US-led intervention in Afghanistan was a war of self-defence, the US 
President nevertheless felt the need to make a humanitarian argument to support 
his case.  He told Afghans that, „the oppressed people of Afghanistan will know 
the generosity of America and its allies.  As we strike military targets, we‟ll also 
drop food, medicine and supplies to the starving and suffering men and women 
and children of Afghanistan‟ (Bush 2001).  The United States took steps to 
minimize non-combatant suffering in Afghanistan but at least two operational 
choices undermined the humanitarian credentials of the war.  The first was the 
decision to rely heavily on intelligence provided by different Afghan factions for 
the identification of military targets.  This reflected the US determination to 
reduce the risks to its own armed forces.  But this decision left US forces open to 
manipulation by Afghans eager to settle scores with their rivals, resulting in a 
number of attacks where innocent civilians were killed.  The second failure was 
Washington‟s refusal to contribute ground troops to the UN-mandated 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and make a sustained contribution 
to rebuilding Afghanistan.  The ISAF was initially confined to operating in Kabul 
and even though it was later expanded, only relatively small „reconstruction 
teams‟ were dispatched to other regional centers.  In 2005, ISAF became primarily 
engaged with combating a resurgent Taliban.  The relative neglect of post-
intervention Afghanistan can be measured by the amount of resources committed 
to it.  In 2004, the US committed $18.4 billion of development spending to Iraq 
and a mere $1.77 billion to Afghanistan. 
 
 The fact that the United States and its allies felt it necessary to employ 
humanitarian arguments in this case highlights the extent to which this 
justification has become a legitimating basis for military intervention in the post-
cold war world.  However, the use of humanitarian language did not presage a 
new Western commitment to protecting civilians in need.  In Afghanistan, the 
humanitarian impulse has been less important than political and strategic 
considerations, the protection of allied soldiers has been prioritized over the 
security of Afghans, and there has been insufficient commitment to post-conflict 
reconstruction (Wheeler 2004, Wheeler and Morris 2006).  This lends credence to 







The use of humanitarian arguments by the United States, United Kingdom, and 
Australia to justify the invasion and occupation of Iraq posed a crucial challenge 
to the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in international society.  The Iraq 
war was primarily justified as one necessitated by the danger posed by Saddam 
Hussein‟s weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  However, as the offending 
weapons became more elusive, those justifying the use of force to remove Saddam 
Hussein relied increasingly on humanitarian rationales.  As criticism of the war 
mounted, President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair frequently 
retorted that regardless of WMD, the war was justifiable because „Iraq is a better 
place‟ without Saddam (see Cushman 2006).  There are two important issues that 
stem from this.  First, was the war in Iraq a legitimate humanitarian 
intervention?  We cover the arguments for and against this proposition in the 
Case Study.  Second, how was Iraq perceived by the society of states, and what 
effect has this case had on the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention?   
 
Case Study Here 
 
Many commentators and politicians believe that the use of humanitarian 
justifications in relation to Iraq damaged the emerging norm of humanitarian 
intervention by highlighting the potential for the norm to be abused by the 
powerful to justify interfering in the affairs of the weak.  Of course, many states 
were deeply skeptical about humanitarian intervention before Iraq, but there is 
evidence that some states that were initially supportive of humanitarian 
intervention have become less so as a result of the perceived misuse of 
humanitarian rationales over Iraq.  For example, in 2003 Germany – a strong 
supporter of the Kosovo intervention – refused to endorse a British statement on 
the „responsibility to protect‟ because it feared that any doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention outside the UNSC might be used by the USA and UK 
to justify the invasion of Iraq (Bellamy 2005: 39).  A more subtle variant on this 
argument holds that whilst Iraq may not have damaged the norm itself, it has 
damaged the status of the USA and UK as norm carriers, weakening the extent 
to which they are able to persuade others to agree to action in humanitarian 
crises (Bellamy 2005, Wheeler and Morris 2006).  As Kenneth Roth of Human 
Rights Watch grimly predicted, as a consequence of the use of humanitarian 
justifications in relation to Iraq, „it will be more difficult next time for us to call on 
military action when we need it to save potentially hundreds of thousands of lives‟ 
(Roth 2004: 2-3).  Sadly, Roth‟s prediction was proved correct by the world‟s 




Since 2003, the Sudanese government and its „janjaweed‟ militia have embarked 
on what the UN has described as a „reign of terror‟ in Darfur.  At least 250,000 
people have died and over two million people have been forced from their homes.  
Despite this toll of human suffering, at the time of writing the world‟s response 
had been limited to the deployment of an understaffed and under-funded African 
Union (AU) mission that has proved utterly incapable of protecting civilians from 
harm. 
 
 Why has the world‟s response been so tepid?  Three sets of factors are at 
work.  The first, emphasized by the British and American governments especially, 
are prudential concerns. The Sudanese government has steadfastly refused to 
contemplate any non-African deployments in Darfur, so any armed intervention 
might be strongly resisted.  In addition, intervention might make the Sudanese 
government close its ports to aid agencies, making it difficult to get life-saving 
assistance to the refugees.  There are also worries that firm action in Darfur 
might ruin a peace settlement for Sudan‟s other civil war, which claimed two 
million lives over more than a decade.  The second set of factors relate more 
directly to the war on terror.  The idea of forcible Western intervention in Darfur 
is strongly opposed by Russia, China, the AU, and the NAM.  Since the invasion 
of Iraq, many states have been keen to reaffirm the principle of state sovereignty 
and are less willing than before to contemplate actions that violate this.  Finally, 
the reluctance to act in Darfur demonstrates the continuing relevance of statism.  
Just as in Rwanda, Western governments do not want to sacrifice troops and 
treasure to stop one group of Africans killing another group.  Furthermore, 
several of the great powers have self-interested reasons for not upsetting the 
Sudanese government:  China has significant interests in Sudanese oil; Russia 
has a smaller oil interest but also sells arms to Sudan; and the United States sees 
Sudan as a vital regional ally in the war on terror.  The enduring logic of statism 
means that these powers afford more weight to their interests than they do to the 
lives of Darfurians. 
 
 Overall, the sceptical position has proven more accurate than the optimistic 
one in relation to humanitarian intervention after 9/11.  Humanitarian 
justifications are being used with greater frequency to justify a wide range of 
military operations, but the developing consensus on a new norm charted in the 
previous section has been set back by the perceived abuse of humanitarian 
claims in relation to Afghanistan and especially Iraq.  Many governments, 
especially in the NAM have reacted to this by reaffirming state sovereignty.  This 
worrying development was manifested in international society‟s failure to prevent 
or end the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur.  Yet at the same time, the 
inroads that humanitarian concerns have made into the sovereign prerogatives of 
states can be seen in the agreement at the 2005 UN World Summit to the idea of 
the „responsibility to protect‟.  The next section will explore how far this offers the 
basis for a new global consensus on the use of force to protect endangered 
peoples.   
 
Key points: 
 Optimists argued that 9/11 injected self-interest into humanitarian 
endeavors, making states more likely to intervene to halt human suffering. 
 Skeptics worried that the war on terror would „crowd out‟ humanitarianism 
and encourage powerful states to cloak self-interest in the veneer of 
humanitarian concern. 
 There was a major debate about whether or not the war in Iraq could be 
justified as a legitimate humanitarian intervention. 
 Iraq has made many states more wary of embracing a humanitarian 
exception to the rule of non-intervention. 
 A combination of prudence and statism has contributed towards inactivity 








The Responsibility to Protect 
 
The Responsibility to Protect, the 2001 report of the ICISS, attempted to resolve the 
tension between the competing claims of sovereignty and human rights by building 
a new consensus around the principles that should govern the protection of 
endangered peoples.  The principle of „responsibility to protect‟ was adopted by 
the UN General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit, a move described as a 
„revolution…in international affairs‟ by one commentator (Lindberg 2005). But 
what is the „responsibility to protect‟, how was it adopted, and what does it mean 
for the future of humanitarian intervention.   
 
The ICISS Report 
 
The Commission argued that states have the primary responsibility to protect 
their citizens.  When they are unable or unwilling to do so, or when they 
deliberately terrorize their citizens, the „the principle of non-intervention yields to 
the international responsibility to protect‟ (ICISS 2001: xi).  The report broadens 
this responsibility to encompass not only the responsibility to react to 
humanitarian crises but also the responsibility to prevent such crises and the 
„responsibility to rebuild‟ failed and tyrannical states.  This reframing of the 
debate away from the question of whether states have a right of intervention 
towards the question of where responsibility rests for protecting endangered 
peoples formed the basis of an attempt to generate a new international political 
consensus supporting what the ICISS report calls „intervention for human 
protection purposes‟ (ICISS 2001: xiii). 
 
 Two crucial motivating factors behind the setting up of ICISS were the 
aspiration to avoid future situations like Kosovo, where the UNSC was paralyzed 
by division among the five permanent members of the UNSC (P-5), and future 
situations like Rwanda, where the world stood aside as genocide unfolded.   
 
There are two competing accounts of the causes of deadlock in the UNSC 
over Kosovo.  On the one hand, there are those like British Prime Minister, Tony 
Blair, who argued that it was caused by „unreasonable‟ threats of veto on the part 
of Russia and China (Bellamy 2006: 148, see also Wheeler and Dunne 2004). 
This position was endorsed by the two co-chairs of the ICISS when they described 
the UNSC‟s failure to authorise armed intervention in Kosovo as a failure „to 
discharge its own responsibility to protect in a conscience-shocking situation 
crying out for action‟ (Evans and Sahnoun 2002: 108).  The alternative position 
holds that Russia and China had genuine concerns about the use of force, based 
on their view that the level of killing and ethnic cleansing was not bad enough to 
warrant intervention.  To build an international consensus that would help 
prevent future Kosovos, therefore, the ICISS needed to make it more difficult for 
members of the UNSC to use the veto capriciously, but also to make it harder for 
states to abuse humanitarian justifications.  The principle device for achieving 
this goal was a set of criteria that governments and other observers could use to 
evaluate whether military intervention would be legitimate on humanitarian 
grounds (see Box 3).  The ICISS argued that if states committed to these 
principles, it would make it easier to build consensus on how to respond to 
humanitarian emergencies.  On the one hand, it would be harder for states like 
China and Russia to oppose genuine humanitarian intervention because they 
would have committed themselves to the responsibility to protect in cases of 
genocide, mass killing, and large-scale ethnic cleansing (the thresholds 
established by the ICISS that justify military intervention).  On the other hand, it 
would be harder for states to abuse humanitarian justifications because it would 
be very difficult to satisfy these criteria in cases where there was not a compelling 
humanitarian rationale to act.   
  
 Preventing future Rwandas can be boiled down to overcoming a single 
obstacle: how to persuade states, particularly powerful states, to risk troops and 
treasure to save strangers in distant lands where few strategic interests at stake.  
Overcoming this obstacle requires that two fundamental problems be addressed: 
first, identifying precisely which actors should assume the responsibility to 
protect and second, persuading those actors to accept the obligation to use force 
for „human protection purposes‟.  
 
 According to the ICISS, the UNSC has the primary responsibility to act.  
The report argued that if it failed to live up to this responsibility, there was a 
danger that other states might choose to take the law into their own hands with 
negative consequences for both order and justice.  The Commissioners warned 
that, 
 
if the Security Council fails to discharge its responsibility in 
conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, then it is 
unrealistic to expect that concerned states will rule out other 
means and forms of action to meet the gravity and urgency of 
these situations.  If collective organizations will not authorise 
collection intervention against regimes that flout the most 
elemental forms of legitimate governmental behaviour, then the 
pressures for intervention by ad hoc coalitions or individual 
states will surely intensify.  And there is a risk then that such 
interventions, without the discipline and constraints of UN 
authorization, will not be conducted for the right reasons or 
with the right commitment to the necessary precautionary 
principles (ICISS 2001: 71). 
 
In cases where there is majority support for intervention in the UNSC (a 
resolution supporting for intervention for humanitarian purposes has secured 
nine votes or more), but collective action is blocked by a veto, the ICISS 
suggested that states seek political support from the General Assembly.  If it was 
not possible to secure a two thirds majority in that body recommending military 
action (the legal basis of which would be highly dubious), the report even more 
tentatively suggested that intervention might still be justifiable if authorised by a 
relevant regional organizations (ICISS 2001: 75.  See also Wheeler 2005).  This 
suggests a hierarchy of where responsibility lies, starting with the host state, 
then the UNSC, the General Assembly, regional organizations, coalitions of the 
willing and finally individual states. 
 
 How, though, are we to persuade governments to abandon the statism 
that caused the world to stand aside in Rwanda and, more recently, Darfur?  
The ICISS had an answer to this, too.  A commitment to the just cause 
thresholds would create expectations amongst domestic publics about when 
their governments ought to act to save imperilled people.  Thus, in cases of mass 
killing and ethnic cleansing, governments would be put under pressure to act 
because they had already committed in principle to doing so.   
  
 Although the ICISS marked a bold and important step towards building 
consensus, there are at least three important problems with the logic that it 
employed. 
 
Agreement on criteria does not guarantee agreement on action in real cases 
 
States might agree on what criteria to use in making judgments about 
humanitarian intervention, but the application of the criteria to real cases is 
always open to interpretation.  Skilled lawyers and diplomats will use the criteria 
to make convincing arguments both for and against particular interventions, as 
they did in the recent case of Darfur (Bellamy 2005).  In 2005, UNSC members 
argued about whether or not the Sudanese government had indeed proven itself 
„unable and unwilling‟ to protect its people.  Without an authoritative judge to 
determine such matters, the criteria can only provide a language for argument 
and discussion.  They cannot resolve differences of opinion.  
 
The criteria are open to manipulation by powerful actors 
 
Although criteria reduces the dangers of abuse by establishing the parameters 
within which justifying arguments have to be framed, the way the facts are 
interpreted and the arguments presented are inevitably shaped by power politics. 
Moreover, the interpretations of powerful states with the capacity to reward and 
punish others are likely to carry more weight in the deliberations of governments, 
than the arguments of those who lack such sticks and carrots. 
 
Assumes that governments can be persuaded to act 
 
Translating the „responsibility to protect‟ from the ideal into reality rests on the 
notion that governments can be shamed into acting to end genocide, mass killing, 
and large-scale ethnic cleansing by moral pressure from other governments, their 
own citizens, and wider world public opinion.  There are reasons to doubt that 
these pressures can really be so effective.  Imagine if there had been an ICISS 
report in early 1994.  Would New Zealand as President of the UNSC for April (the 
presidency rotates each month between the members of the UNSC) have been 
able to „shame‟ the Clinton Administration into intervening in Rwanda?  If this 
logic holds, why were major public campaigns such as the Save Darfur Coalition 
unable to persuade their governments to act more effectively?  Public opinion can 
only galvanise action when governments themselves are already predisposed 
towards taking it.  Sadly, few citizens change the way they vote because their 
government chooses not to intervene to save foreigners. 
 
The 2005 World Summit 
 
In 2005, the UN World Summit adopted a declaration committing all one hundred 
and ninety one member-states to the principle of the responsibility to protect.  
Some lauded it as a major breakthrough, whilst others argued that the ICISS 
report‟s findings had been watered down to such an extent that it would not, in 
practice, afford new protections to imperiled peoples.  There are some notable 
differences between the ICISS report and the World Summit text.  What are those 
differences and how did they come about? 
 
Box 5 somewhere here 
 
The 2001 ICISS report was received most favorably by states such as Canada (the 
progenitor of the idea of the ICISS and the political custodian of the process), 
Germany, and the United Kingdom (since the 1999 Kosovo intervention, the British 
led by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Robin Cook, had been exploring 
the potential to develop criteria to guide global decision-making about 
humanitarian intervention).  Other supporters of the ICISS report included 
Argentina, Australia, Colombia, Croatia, Ireland, South Korea, New Zealand, 
Norway, Peru, Rwanda, Sweden, and Tanzania.  The great powers were much 
more sceptical from the outset.  The United States rejected the idea of criteria on 
the grounds that it could not offer pre-commitments to engage its military forces 
where it had no national interests at stake, and that it would not bind itself to 
criteria that would constrain its right to decide when and where to use force 
(Welsh 2004: 180).  China insisted that all questions relating to the use of force 
should be dealt with by the UNSC, a position supported by Russia.  Both of these 
countries argued that the UN was already equipped to deal with humanitarian 
crises, and that by countenancing unauthorized intervention, the Responsibility 
to Protect risked undermining the UN Charter. 
 
 Opinion outside the UNSC was also generally cuatious.  The NAM rejected 
the concept.  India, for example, argued that the UNSC was already sufficiently 
empowered to act in humanitarian emergencies and observed that the failure to 
act in the past was caused by a lack of political will not a lack of authority.  
Speaking on behalf of the NAM, the Malaysian government argued that the 
Responsibility to Protect represented a reincarnation of humanitarian intervention 
for which there was no basis in international law. 
 
 As a result of these doubts, significant changes had to be made to persuade 
states to adopt the principle of the responsibility to protect.  In particular, the 
proposal to include criteria governing the use of force was dropped during the 
negotiations leading up to the agreement at the World Summit.  Moreover, and 
significantly watering down the recommendations in the ICISS report, it was 
agreed that responsibility to protect intervention required express UNSC 
authorization.  This closed down the possibility of appealing to other bodies even 
if the will of a majority of Council members was blocked by one or more of the P-5 
exercising the veto (Wheeler 2005).  Although momentous in that this was the 
first time that the society of states had formally declared that sovereignty might 
sometimes give way to concerns about human rights, it is perhaps best 
understood as a codification of the humanitarian intervention norm that had 
developed in the 1990s.   
 
Key points: 
 The „responsibility to protect‟ switches the focus from a debate about 
sovereignty versus human rights to a discussion of how best to protect 
endangered peoples. 
 The ICISS report attempted to move the norm of humanitarian intervention 
forward by forging a new consensus around the criteria for judging when 
armed intervention for humanitarian purposes was justifiable. 
 There are good reasons to think that criteria alone will not galvanise action 
or consensus in difficult cases. 
 The responsibility to protect was adopted by states at the 2005 World 




Globalization is bringing nearer Kant's vision of moral interconnectedness, but as 
the Rwandan genocide and global inaction over Darfur so brutally demonstrate, 
this growth in „cosmopolitan moral awareness‟ has not yet been translated into a 
global consensus on forcible humanitarian intervention.  Western publics are 
increasingly sensitized to the human suffering of others, but this media nurtured 
sense of compassion is very selective in its response to human suffering.  The 
media spotlight ensured that governments directed their humanitarian energies to 
the crises in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia, but during the same period 
millions perished in the brutal civil wars in Angola, Liberia, and the DRC. 
 
 Each case has to be judged on its merits, but as the examples of Somalia, 
and perhaps Kosovo demonstrate, interventions which begin with humanitarian 
credentials can all too easily degenerate into „a range of policies and activities 
which go beyond, or even conflict with, the label “humanitarian”‟ (Roberts 1993: 
448).  A further fundamental problem with a strategy of forcible humanitarian 
intervention concerns the so-called `body-bag' factor.  Is domestic public opinion, 
especially in Western states, prepared to see their military personnel die in the 
cause of humanitarian intervention? A striking feature of all post-cold war 
humanitarian interventions is that no Western government has yet chosen to risk 
its military personnel in defence of human rights where there was a significant risk 
of casualties from the outset. 
  
 Since 9/11, Western states have expressed humanitarian sentiments in 
relation to many different types of war.  Whilst this indicates the growing power of 
humanitarianism, the downside of this is that states might abuse humanitarian 
rationales in justifying their use of force, whilst only selectively responding to 
humanitarian crises in strategically important areas.  For many in the developing 
world, this is precisely what the United States and the United Kingdom have done 
in Iraq, damaging rather than furthering the humanitarian agenda.   
      
 The chapter ended by considering the responsibility to protect, which has 
sought to reshape the terms of the debate between supporters and opponents of 
humanitarian intervention.  The concept has certainly helped change the political 
language used to describe and debate humanitarian intervention, and its adoption 
at the UN World Summit was an important milestone.  The real test, however, is 
whether it will generate a new political will on the part of the major states to incur 
the costs and risks of saving strangers.  The evidence from Darfur is not 




1. How far is the use of force the defining characteristic of a humanitarian 
intervention? 
 
2. How important are motives, intentions, means, and outcomes in judging the 
humanitarian credentials of an intervention? 
 




4. Should considerations of international order always be privileged over concerns 
of individual justice in the society of states? 
 
5. Why has the society of states failed to arrive at a collective consensus on what 
moral principles should underpin a right of humanitarian intervention? 
 
6. Is there a new norm of legitimate humanitarian intervention?  
 
7. Has the „war on terror‟ made it less likely that powerful states will use their  
armed forces to „save strangers‟? 
 
8. Was the 2003 invasion of Iraq a legitimate humanitarian intervention? 
9. To what extent does the „responsibility to protect‟ principle resolve some of 
the political problems association with humanitarian intervention? 
 
10. How far is military force an effective instrument for the promotion of 
humanitarian values? 
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relevant speeches. 
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Summary of Key Concepts in the Theory of Humanitarian Intervention 
 
Abuse  - States justify self-interested wars by reference to humanitarian 
principles 
 
Common humanity – We all have human rights by virtue of our common 
humanity, and these rights generate correlative moral duties for individuals and 
states. 
 
Communitarianism – The idea that moral values are produced by discrete 
communities and that there is therefore no common humanity. 
 
Cosmopolitanism – The idea that all humans comprise a single universal 
community. 
 
Counter-restrictionists – International lawyers who argue that there is a legal 
right of humanitarian intervention in both the UN Charter and customary 
international law. 
 
Formatted: Font: Not Bold
Humanitarian intervention – Military intervention that breaches the principle of 
state sovereignty where the primary purpose is to alleviate the human suffering 
of some or all within the state‟s borders. 
 
Pluralist international society theory  - States share common interests and 
values but these are limited to norms of sovereignty and non-intervention that 
provide a basic degree of order in world politics. 
 
Responsibility to Protect – States have a responsibility to protect their own 
citizens but when they are unable or unwilling to do so, this responsibility is 
transferred to the society of states. 
 
Selectivity – An agreed moral principle is at stake in more than one situation, 
but national interest dictates a divergence of response. 
 
Statism – The moral claim that states only have duties to their own citizens, and 
that they should not risk their soldiers lives to protect the citizens of other states. 
 
Tyrannical states – States where the sovereign government is massively abusing 
the human rights of its citizens, engaging in acts of mass killing, ethnic cleansing 
and/or genocide. 
 
Unilateral humanitarian intervention – Military intervention for humanitarian 
purposes which is undertaken without the express authorisation of the United 
Nations Security Council. 
 
Box 3: The Responsibility to Protect: principles for military intervention 
 
The Responsibility to Protect: Principles for Military Intervention 
(1) The Just Cause Threshold 
Military intervention for human protection purposes is an exceptional and 
extraordinary measure. To be warranted, there must be serious and irreparable harm 
occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur, of the following kind: 
A. large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, 
which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or 
inability to act, or a failed state situation; or  
B. large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by 
killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.  
(2) The Precautionary Principles 
A. Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other 
motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. 
Right intention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported 
by regional opinion and the victims concerned.  
B. Last resort: Military intervention can only be justified when every non-
military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been 
explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not 
have succeeded. 
C. Proportional means: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military 
intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human 
protection objective. 
D. Reasonable prospects: There must be a reasonable chance of success in 
halting or averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the 
consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of 
inaction. 
(3) Right Authority 
A. There is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security 
Council to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes. The 
task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, 
but to make the Security Council work better than it has. 
B. Security Council authorization should in all cases be sought prior to any 
military intervention action being carried out. Those calling for an intervention 
should formally request such authorization, or have the Council raise the 
matter on its own initiative, or have the Secretary-General raise it under 
Article 99 of the UN Charter. 
C. The Security Council should deal promptly with any request for authority to 
intervene where there are allegations of large scale loss of human life or ethnic 
cleansing. It should in this context seek adequate verification of facts or 
conditions on the ground that might support a military intervention. 
D. The Permanent Five members of the Security Council should agree not to 
apply their veto power, in matters where their vital state interests are not 
involved, to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing military 
intervention for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise 
majority support. 
E. If the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable 
time, alternative options are: 
I. consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency 
Special Session under the “Uniting for Peace” procedure; and  
II. action within area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional 
organizations under Chapter VIII of the Charter, subject to their 
seeking subsequent authorization from the Security Council. 
F. The Security Council should take into account in all its deliberations that, if it 
fails to discharge its responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations 
crying out for action, concerned states may not rule out other means to meet 
the gravity and urgency of that situation - and that the stature and credibility of 
the United Nations may suffer thereby. 
(4) Operational Principles 
A. Clear objectives; clear and unambiguous mandate at all times; and resources to 
match. 
B. Common military approach among involved partners; unity of command; clear 
and unequivocal communications and chain of command. 
C. Acceptance of limitations, incrementalism and gradualism in the application of 
force, the objective being protection of a population, not defeat of a state. 
D. Rules of engagement which fit the operational concept; are precise; reflect the 
principle of proportionality; and involve total adherence to international 
humanitarian law. 
E. Acceptance that force protection cannot become the principal objective. 
F. Maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organizations. 





Box 4: Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document 
 
138. Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.  This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, 
including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means.  
We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it.  The 
international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help 
States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in 
establishing an early warning capability. 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of 
the United Nations, to help protect populations from war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.  In this context, we are prepared 
to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, 
on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and 
national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.  
 




1. The Security Council should be prepared to refer matters to the 
International Criminal Court. 
2. The UN and other agencies should work towards cooperative agreements 
about the management of natural resources. 
3. The UN should develop frameworks for minority rights and the protection 
of democratic governments from unconstitutional overthrow. 
4. The UN should expedite negotiations on the marking and tracing of small 
arms. 
5. Member states should give accurate reports to the UN Register on 
Conventional Arms. 
6. A training facility should be created for Special-Representatives to the 
Secretary-General. 
7. The UN‟s Department for Political Affairs should be given additional 
resources for preventive diplomacy. 
8. The UN should create a mediation support capacity, develop its 
competence on thematic issues, increase its interaction with other 
agencies and consult with civil society during peace processes. 
9. Parties to conflicts should make constructive use of preventive 
peacekeepers (High Level Panel 2004: 90-104). 
 
 
Case Study.  Iraq: A Humanitarian Intervention? 
 
The case for 
The case for seeing Iraq as a legitimate humanitarian intervention came from a 
variety of sources, including liberals, neo-conservatives, and the left. We will 
focus only on the liberal case, as put forward by Fernando Tesón (2005: 1-20, see 
also Cushman 2005). Tesón‟s case was predicated on four claims.  First, the 
invasion of Iraq had as its purpose the ending of tyranny.  According to Tesón, 
humanitarian intervention requires humanitarian intent, not humanitarian 
motive (like realists, Tesón believes that states will never act out of purely 
humanitarian motives).  Even though the US-led coalition was not motivated by 
humanitarian impulses, it still had humanitarian intentions because only by 
removing tyranny and installing democracy would the threat posed by Iraq be 
removed.  Second, Tesón argued that the abuse of civilians by the Iraqi 
government was severe enough to warrant intervention, arguing that that it 
makes no sense to argue that intervention should be reserved for on-going mass-
killing because that rule would have prohibited the removal of Hitler after the 
Holocaust.  Third, Tesón pointed to the fact that the overwhelming majority of 
Iraqis welcomed the intervention as providing an important source of legitimacy.  
Finally, he argued that although UN authorization is preferable, the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention permits unauthorized intervention, as in the case of 
Kosovo.    
 
The case against 
Opposition to this case came from an equally diverse range of people.  Even some 
people who defend an expansive right to humanitarian intervention rejected the 
humanitarian case for invading Iraq.  We will focus on Terry Nardin‟s response to 
Tesón‟s argument (2005: 21, see also Evans 2004, Wheeler and Morris 2006).  
Nardin argued that Tesón‟s case involved „significant revision‟ of the traditional 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention.  First of all, according to the traditional 
doctrine, intervention is permitted only by the commission of particular crimes 
(genocide, mass killing) not by the „character‟ of the regime.  As Nardin put it, 
„humanitarian intervention aims to rescue the potential victims of massacre or 
some other crime against humanity by thwarting the violence against them‟ 
(2005: 22).  Second, Nardin argued that Tesón‟s position overlooked international 
society‟s strong predisposition towards non-intervention.  Third, he claimed that 
humanitarian intervention could only be justified if it was calculated to cause 
more good than harm.  Iraq‟s current woes were foreseen.  Finally, Nardin argues 
that Tesón‟s account misunderstood the place of humanitarian intervention in 
international society.  Nardin argued that international society is based on rules 
of coexistence and that humanitarian intervention is a carefully calibrated 
exception to those rules.  Tesón understands world politics as being based „not on 
rules of coexistence but solely and directly on universal principles of morality and 
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